April 24 3-4.30 pm, Clark 210 – Anthony “Tony” Jack

The Genuine Problem of Consciousness 

What should a rigorous science of consciousness look like? Can scientific accounts 

ever tell us “what it is like to be”? Might that be better achieved by the arts and humanities?

Consciousness science is locked in a stalemate: major theories remain unchanged, empirical tests prove inconclusive, and philosophers embrace positions—from panpsychism to illusionism—that sit uneasily with any scientific framework. This impasse is itself a clue. The persistence of the “hard problem of consciousness” suggests the field has been focused on the wrong question. Perhaps there is no missing ingredient; perhaps the problem reveals something about the minds trying to understand it.

Cognitive network neuroscience illuminates the mystery. The brain’s Task Positive Network (analytic reason) and Default Mode Network (empathic reason) employ incompatible representational formats and actively suppress one another. Phenomenal concepts carry visceral mattering; physical concepts are stripped of it. The act of comprehending an objective theory gets in the way of grasping what experience is like. The notion of an “objective account of subjective experience” doesn’t just sound like an oxymoron–it really is one (in philosophical jargon, a category mistake). 

Physical accounts really do leave something out, but what they leave out is a type of understanding, not an ingredient in nature. The hard problem assumes this gap should close; neuroscience shows why it cannot. Consciousness science has been chasing an illusion of commensurability. The genuine problem of consciousness is different. Understanding the biological basis of the problem of consciousness illuminates a path for progress: building explanatory bridges between incommensurable perspectives. Making real progress on consciousness can only be achieved by respectful collaboration between C.P. Snow’s two cultures.